Is it Time to Call Off the Andrew Wiggins Search Party?

Remember four years ago when it was all about ‘Riggin’ for Wiggins’?

Today, Minnesota’s decent record so far this season (22-14) seems to have glossed over the fact that Andrew Wiggins still hasn’t arrived – and has even regressed to the point where he may well never.

Here are the cold, hard facts on his career so far:

Per game

YR MPG PPG RPG APG ST+B FG% 3PT% FT%
1 36.2 16.9 4.6 2.1 1.6 43.7 31.0 76.0
2 35.1 20.7 3.6 2.0 1.6 45.9 30.0 76.1
3 37.2 23.6 4.0 2.3 1.4 45.2 35.6 76.0
4 36.5 17.7 3.9 1.7 1.8 43.2 33.1 61.8

Basic advanced

YR TS% REB% AST% TO% USG PER
1 51.7 7.2 9.8 11.7 22.6 13.9
2 54.3 5.9 10.1 10.6 27.2 16.5
3 53.4 6.3 10.6 9.4 29.0 16.5
4 50.4 6.3 7.1 8.7 23.4 13.0

Let’s go through what we have:

  • His per game scoring numbers went up in his first three years – largely because of his increased usage as he was handed the keys to Minnesota’s offense (spoiler alert: it didn’t end well).
  • His already anemic rebounding rate has never improved – and has now regressed even further to the point where he would rank 44th among POINT GUARDS (behind Yogi Ferrell).
  • His ability to create for others has never significantly improved since his rookie season – and has now regressed to the point where he would rank 48th among CENTRES for assist rate (behind Dwight Howard!).
  • His stocks (steals plus blocks) continue to reflect the play of an unathletic spot up shooter (Buddy Hield averages 1.2 stocks in 23.0mpg – Wiggins averages 1.8 in 36.5mpg – you tell me the difference).
  • His shooting has always been sub-par and has now regressed to the point of being atrocious. Just have a look at the current league average shooting numbers and compare them to Wiggins’ numbers:

League FG%: 45.9 – Wiggins FG%: 43.2

League 3PT%: 36.3 – Wiggins 3PT%: 33.1

League FT%: 76.5 – Wiggins FT%: 61.8 (although he’s about 76% career)

League TS%: about 54-55% – Wiggins TS%: 50.4 (not far off being historically bad – think Ricky Rubio)

  • His overall player efficiency rating has never exceeded the level of an average quality starter – and is currently at the level of a handy bench player (oof).
  • He still takes a maddening number of long range two point shots (between 16ft and 3pt):

Year 1: 22.5% (of his total field goal attempts)

Year 2: 24.3%

Year 3: 25.3%

Year 4: 20.5%

  • He’s completely stopped taking it the rack and doesn’t get to the foul line enough (because he’s too busy trying to be like Ron Mercer):

Year 1: 41.0% (Free throw rate – i.e. free throw attempts per field goal attempt)

Year 2: 43.7%

Year 3: 34.5%

Year 4: 29.4%

I’m not surprised that it took Jimmy Butler about 6 weeks to see enough of Wiggins and say: ‘step aside pal, I’ll take it from here – you just stand over there in the corner, sign autographs and let the big dog eat’:

  • JB – October usage rate: 19.8% – Wiggins: 25.7%
  • JB – November usage rate: 23.0% – Wiggins: 22.4%
  • JB – December usage rate: 26.8% – Wiggins 22.6%

With Towns and Butler now the clear 1 and 1A for the Wolves, the question is where does this leave Wiggins?

And what about Minnesota – which is on the hook for another 5 years (after this one) and $150 million in salary (max)?

Given that Wiggins never demonstrated any significant improvement in his game in his first three years, why did Minnesota rush to sign him to a max deal before this season? Given that he was still on his rookie contract, Wiggins was only ever going to be a restricted free agent at the end of this season and Minnesota could have matched any max offer thrown at him at that point (if he really was that good). Instead, they lavished Wiggins with a max deal that effectively told him that he was already a max player – when the reality was that he was miles off.

Only two words are needed to describe this: bad management. That and the fact there is no way in hell someone like Danny Ainge or RC Buford would have done something like that.

Unless Wiggins pulls his finger out quickly, this one could get ugly. It’s deals like his that often make the difference between a relevant, second tear team and a genuine contender when the time comes to ‘win now’.